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This essay blends history, law, and politics in considering the role of legal 
imperialism nineteenth-century English extradition law in colonial Hong 
Kong.  Building upon the pioneering work of Jerome Cohen, this essay 
enhances and clarifies our understanding of Chinese legal history and its 
continued (and future) influence on Sino-Western relations.  By focusing 
upon the series of In re Kwok-a-Sing decisions as they traversed courts 
from colonial Hong Kong to imperial London, this study analyzes how, 
through skilful legal reasoning, the British courts managed to circumvent 
laws and assert their political domination in Southeast Asia by repeatedly 
refusing to extradite Kwok-a-Sing to China.  In the process, the paper 
considers how Britain and other Western powers (including the United 
States) invariably used law to subordinate China, facilitating a cultural 
alienation and humiliation whose effects continue to dog Sino-Western 
relations.  It accordingly makes legal history relevant to understanding 
contemporary international politics. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
At half past four in the afternoon on October 4, 1870 in the South 
China Sea, a party of some twenty Chinese coolies commandeered the 
French steamer La Nouvelle Pénélope.1  The men, who had boarded the 
vessel four days earlier in Macao alongside three hundred other coolies, 
typically remained below deck, safely siphoned off from the crew.  That 
particular afternoon, however, the seamen, assured of their safety by the 
massive barriers erected across the deck to separate European sailor from 
Asian laborer, had allowed the coolies above stairs.  Even if the blockades 
failed to halt a Chinese surge, the cannons stationed at each door in the 
barrier would.2  Despite such protections, however, the gang of twenty 
coolies “collected near a seaman, who was keeping guard at a barrier that 
was placed across the deck, attacked him and threw him overboard.”3  
This initial killing complete, the coolies deftly moved to a fore deck where 
the ship’s captain strolled unarmed, wholly unaware of the assault.  His 
ignorance proved fatal, as several coolies attacked and killed him, 
stripping the Frenchman of his watch and a substantial sum of currency, 
before throwing his body overboard into the depths of the Pacific.4  
Within minutes, the cabal murdered the majority of the remaining 
crewmen and forced the few survivors to re-chart the ship’s course from 
Peru back towards China.  Once La Nouvelle Pénélope had reached 
Mainland China the coolies ran the ship aground, where the native 
                                                 
1 Attorney-General of Hong Kong v. Kwok-A-Sing, (1873–74) 5 L.R.P.C. 181 [hereinafter 
Kwok-a-Sing].  See also Attorney-General of Hong Kong v. Kwok-a-Sing (19 June 1873), 
reprinted in 12 REPORTS OF CASES IN CRIMINAL LAW ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN 
ENGLAND AND IRELAND, at 565–73 (Edward Cox ed., 1875) [hereinafter Cox]. 
2 Kwok-a-Sing, supra note 1, at 181. 
3 Id. at 196.  See also Cox, supra note 1, at 568–69 (providing an additional account of 
how the massacre aboard La Nouvelle Pénélope began, which the official Law Reports 
removed). 
4 Cox, supra note 1, at 568–69. 
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population plundered the vessel.5  Many of the coolies subsequently fled 
into Mainland China, where local authorities arrested and tried the men for 
their crimes.6 
One man, however, departed to British-controlled Hong Kong.  
Known as Kwok-a-Sing, the 24-year-old had led the band of coolies in the 
raid of La Nouvelle Pénélope.  One witness later testified that Kwok-a-
Sing also murdered the captain.7  In the subsequent legal battle that 
traversed courts from the magistracy in Hong Kong to the Privy Council 
in London, the British government repeatedly refused to extradite Kwok-
a-Sing to China on charges of murder and piracy.8  Britain’s refusal to 
extradite directly contradicted Hong Kong Ordinance No. 2 of 1850, 
which mandated “the Rendition for Trial to Officers of their own Country 
of such Subjects of China as have committed Crimes or Offences against 
their own Government, and afterwards taken Refuge in Hongkong.”9  An 
appraisal of the ordinance, as well as the acts and treaties governing 
nineteenth-century Anglo-Sino relations, reveals the central role of British 
legal imperialism in solidifying both political and legal control over China 
in the late nineteenth century.  This phenomenon becomes more apparent 
after analyzing the series of In re Kwok-a-Sing judgments rendered by the 
magistracy courts of Hong Kong, the Supreme Court of Hong Kong, and 
finally, the British Privy Council. 
While skeptics may raise their eyebrows as to the relevance of an 
1870 case in understanding China and the modern international legal order, 
Jerome Cohen has repeatedly articulated the intrinsic importance of 
Chinese legal history in making sense of contemporary Sino-Western 
relations.10  Writing in 1980, he astutely noted, “It is a tendency of 
lawyers to be contemporary-minded activists, relevance mongers whose 
interest in legal history is limited to its impact upon the present.”11  As C. 
                                                 
5 Id. at 569. 
6 Kwok-a-Sing, supra note 1, at 181. 
7 Cox, supra note 1, at 568. 
8 Id. 
9  Hong Kong Ordinance No. 2 of 1850, 1850 (Hong Kong), available at 
http://oelawhk.lib.hku.hk/archive/files/85e96901d33124000dbecaacf916237e.pdf. 
10 Jerome A. Cohen, Introduction to ESSAYS ON CHINA’S LEGAL TRADITION 3 (Jerome Alan 
Cohen, R. Randle Edwards & Fu-mei Chang Chen eds., 1980) [hereinafter COHEN, ESSAYS 
ON CHINA’S LEGAL TRADITION]. 
11 Id.  See also Cohen’s monumental first work, JEROME A. COHEN, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS 
IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949–1963, at 5–7 (1968) [hereinafter COHEN, THE 
CRIMINAL PROCESS], demonstrating the value of Chinese legal history as a means of 
understanding fundamental truths about Chinese society that have never wholly vanished.  
Cohen deftly proved how ancient Chinese law reinforced Confucian social norms and 
disentangled the evolution of the Ch’ing Code between 1644 and 1912; he simultaneously 
unearthed a centuries-long seam running between past and present.  See also JEROME A. 
COHEN & HUNGDAH CHIU, 2 PEOPLE’S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DOCUMENTARY 
STUDY (Princeton University ed. 1974) [hereinafter 2 PEOPLE’S CHINA] (underscoring this 
connection between past and present and particularly emphasizing, through documentary 
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Stephen Hsu remarked, Cohen has taken this understanding of Chinese 
legal history beyond the modern international legal order and utilized the 
past to “anticipate the pace and direction of its future development.”12  
Cohen’s conviction that many of China’s contemporary, conflicted 
approaches towards international law developed as a result of the forcible 
introduction of Western diplomatic privileges and immunities during the 
nineteenth century (and the equally forcible refusal of China to implement 
these privileges) finds support in the series of Kwok-a-Sing decisions.13  
Equally, just as Cohen maintains that the Peking elite gradually 
assimilated to the Western international legal tradition following the 
Treaty of Tientsin in 1858, the subtleties of Kwok-a-Sing, while giving 
credence to his position, also demonstrate the continued, underlying 
reticence of the Chinese to fully engage with the Western legal tradition.14  
China’s conflicted attitude towards the West and the international legal 
order thus originated during the nineteenth century, persisted in the 
twentieth century, and, if history is any indicator, as both Cohen and Hsu 
have argued, will continue to dog China’s engagement with the global 
political order in the twenty-first century. 
In re Kwok-a-Sing thus presents an opportunity to both enhance 
and clarify our understanding of Chinese legal history and its continued 
(and future) influence on Sino-Western relations.  An analysis of the 
relevant treaties, acts, and ordinances by the British imperial courts in the 
Kwok-a-Sing cases served three important functions. Foremost, it 
illustrated how, by skillful legal chicanery, Britain legitimized its 
colonization of Hong Kong and domination of the Chinese.  By 
manipulating the application of the law and relying upon Western legal 
and cultural mores in the Kwok-a-Sing decisions, Britain solidified its 
political power in the region to the detriment of China.  Secondly, the 
alternately patronizing and jingoistic language of the various Kwok-a-Sing 
decisions, as well as contemporary government correspondence and news 
accounts of the cases, further augmented British power in the region by 
constructing the Chinese government, laws, and culture as inferior.  By 
casting the Chinese as gross, bestial savages at empire’s peripheries, the 
British justified the implementation of Western law and legal concepts as 
a means of bringing order and civility to China. 
The imposition of English laws and an English political order in 
turn fueled China’s “century of humiliation,” that period of Chinese 
history that began with China’s crushing diplomatic defeat following the 
                                                                                                               
evidence gathered in the People’s Republic of China’s infancy, how China’s historic 
experiences, both foreign and domestic, influenced contemporary attitudes). 
12 C. STEPHEN HSU, Introduction to UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM: ESSAYS IN 
HONOR OF JEROME A. COHEN 3 (C. Stephen Hsu ed., 2003). 
13 COHEN, 2 PEOPLE’S CHINA, supra note 11, at 6–7, 933. 
14 Id. at 933. 
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First Opium War in 1842 and only ended after the expulsion of foreign 
powers from mainland China in 1949.15  As Cohen has aptly demonstrated, 
this third and most long-lasting consequence stigmatized the Chinese 
government and people.16  Indeed, China’s current reticence to engage 
fully with the international legal order is directly tied to the “imperialist 
exploitation” suffered by the Chinese at the hands of the West during the 
nineteenth century.17  The Kwok-a-Sing decisions accordingly demonstrate 
how Britain utilized English law and legal decisions in order to 
consolidate its own power by rendering China politically, legally, and 
culturally inferior.  This in turn provoked a lasting legacy of bitterness and 
a deep skepticism towards the Western international legal order that 
continues to define China’s relationship with the West. 
II. HISTORY & LITERATURE REVIEW 
Contemporary legal and political thinkers attached great 
importance to the Kwok-a-Sing decisions.  They featured prominently in 
various legal treatises beginning in the 1870s, with Edward Cox’s 
voluminous series Reports of Cases in Criminal Law Argued and 
Determined in All the Courts in England and Ireland.18  Including the 
appeal of Kwok-a-Sing in the series gives credence to the concept of 
British legal imperialism, as the case, despite its origin in far-flung 
colonial Hong Kong, was appealed to the Privy Council in London, the 
center of empire.  Its injection into the British court system clearly denotes 
that the imperial writ ran large, a fact underscored by Cox’s ample 
discussion of the case in a text devoted to the courts of England and its 
closest (and arguably most rebellious) colony, Ireland.  Another treatise 
devoted to the Privy Council, J.J. Beauchamp’s The Jurisprudence of the 
Privy Council, recognized Kwok-a-Sing as the standard for all piracy ex 
jure gentium cases.19  The following year, F.T. Piggott commented upon 
                                                 
15 Jerome A. Cohen, Chinese Attitudes Toward Intentional Law—and Our Own, in THE 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: OBSERVATIONS 108, 110, 284 (J. 
Cohen, H. Chieu & D. Johnston eds., 1967) [hereinafter Cohen, Chinese Attitudes]. 
16 Cohen has posited the idea of stigmatization in Chinese Attitudes.  See id. at 111. 
17 Id. at 110. 
18 Cox, supra note 1, at 565. 
19 J.J. BEAUCHAMP, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL: A DIGEST OF ALL THE 
DECISIONS OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL; A SKETCH OF ITS HISTORY; NOTES ON THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE JUDICIAL COMMITTEE; A SUMMARY OF ITS PROCEDURES; AND ALSO THREE 
APPENDICES 608 (1891) [hereinafter BEAUCHAMP, JURISPRUDENCE].  Piracy jure gentium 
literally translates to “piracy concerning laws of nations” (thanks to Catherine Sears for 
this translation).  See also Cox, supra note 1, at 571 (reaffirming the contemporary 
definition of piracy jure gentium as “only a sea term for robbery, piracy being a robbery 
within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty. . . .  If the mariners of any ship shall violently 
dispossess the master, and afterwards carry away the ship itself or any of the goods with a 
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the history of extra-territorial jurisdiction and briefly discussed how the 
case defined extraterritoriality for the British system in Asia in 
Extraterritoriality: The Law Relating to Consular Jurisdiction and 
Residence in Oriental Countries. 20   In his seminal two-volume The 
History of the Laws and Courts of Hong Kong: from the early period to 
1898, J.W. Norton-Kyshe commented upon In re Kwok-a-Sing more than 
any other piracy case in the compendium.21  The commentary regarding 
the proceedings at the magistracy courts and Supreme Court prove 
particularly valuable, as does the commentary on the character of Chief 
Justice John Smale, who presided over Kwok-a-Sing in the colony’s 
Supreme Court.22 
Despite the importance that contemporaries placed upon the 
Kwok-a-Sing decisions, interest in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries 
has seen this once-monumental trial that grappled with such diverse issues 
as extradition, habeas corpus, extraterritoriality, and piracy relegated to a 
mere footnote of history.  In fact by 1925, one scholar queried “Is the 
crime of piracy obsolete?” in a law review piece of the same name.23  In 
answering with a resounding “Yes,” Edwin Dickinson discussed Kwok-a-
Sing in regards to extradition law and piracy, noting that the Supreme 
Court of Hong Kong twice refused to extradite Kwok-a-Sing, despite 
piracy’s status as an international crime.24   Unfortunately, Dickinson 
concluded his brief analysis of the Kwok-a-Sing decisions with a mere 
note that the Privy Council determined Kwok-a-Sing could stand trial on 
the charge of piracy by the law of nations.25  This conclusion is both over-
simplified and misleading, as the Privy Council refused to extradite 
Kwok-a-Sing, as Dickinson recognized, but also stipulated to his trial in a 
British court in Hong Kong.  A reappraisal of what occurred is thus 
required. 
Although other scholarly materials of the twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries briefly mention Kwok-a-Sing, most do so only as a 
footnote in law review articles on maritime and piracy cases.26  In fact the 
                                                                                                               
felonious intention in any place where the Lord Admiral hath jurisdiction, this is robbery 
and piracy[.]”). 
20  Sir FRANCIS TAYLOR PIGGOTT, EXTRATERRITORIALITY: THE LAW RELATING TO 
CONSULAR JURISDICTION AND TO RESIDENCE IN ORIENTAL COUNTRIES 47–48 (1892). 
21 J.W. NORTON-KYSHE, 2 THE HISTORY OF THE LAWS AND COURTS OF HONG KONG: FROM 
THE EARLY PERIOD TO 1898 (1898). 
22 Id. at 186–87. 
23 Edwin D. Dickinson, Is the Crime of Piracy Obsolete?, 38 HARV. L. REV. 334–60 (Jan. 
1925) [hereinafter Dickinson, Crime of Piracy]. 
24 Id. at 354. 
25 Id. 
26 See, e.g., Guy Manchuk, The Law of the Flag and Maritime Criminal Jurisdiction: A 
New Rule to Replace an Outdated, Inconvenient Doctrine, 32 TUL. MAR. L.J. 221, 231 
(Winter 2007); Robert J. Currie & Stephen Coughlan, Extraterritorial Criminal 
Jurisdiction: Bigger Picture or Smaller Frame?, 11 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 141 (Feb. 2007). 
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only recent work to consider Kwok-a-Sing and its larger significance 
beyond mere piracy and extradition law is “Kwok-a-Sing, Sir John Smale, 
and the Macao Coolie Trade” by Peter Wesley-Smith.27  Wesley-Smith 
arguably takes a human rights approach to the cases, focusing not upon 
the legal issues, but Chief Justice Smale’s commitment to the liberation of 
coolies.  Indeed, Wesley-Smith posits that Smale refused Kwok-a-Sing’s 
extradition on two occasions due to his belief that the French crew of La 
Nouvelle Pénélope forced the coolies aboard the vessel against their will.28  
Accordingly, Smale viewed his refusal to extradite or try Kwok-a-Sing for 
crimes of murder and piracy as the morally correct decision.29  Wesley-
Smith’s article importantly assesses the larger considerations of Kwok-a-
Sing in contemporary politics from a human rights perspective.  Similarly, 
an evaluation of the Kwok-a-Sing decisions in regards to British legal 
imperialism and its effect on China’s role in the international legal and 
political orders would complement Wesley-Smith’s article.  Moreover, it 
would also fulfill Professor Cohen’s opprobrium that “scholars of 
international law can do much more than they already have” to study 
diplomatic and political privileges and immunities in the nineteenth 
century.30  This work proposes to fill both of these noticeable gaps. 
III. THE THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF CONSTRUCTING 
DISPARITY 
The British interest in China began in the late eighteenth century 
with the advent of the tea, silk, and opium trades.  At a reception held 
during Lord Macartney’s first embassy to China in 1792–94, Emperor 
Qianlong haughtily remarked to King George III’s ambassador that “our 
Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and lacks no 
product within its own border [and] there [is] therefore no need to import 
the manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange of our own 
produce.”31  Despite the initial discord, the two great empires of East and 
West began to trade with one another, though evidence suggests that 
China did not view Britain as a true equal to the Middle Kingdom.32  
Equal or no, tensions between Britain and China exacerbated during the 
early nineteenth century, culminating in the First Opium War in 1839, 
which Britain waged following China’s refusal to export opium to British 
traders and, equally controversially, China’s confiscation of opium stores 
                                                 
27  Peter Wesley-Smith, Kwok-a-Sing, Sir John Smale, and the Macao Coolie Trade, 
H.K.L.J. 124–34 (1993). 
28 Id. at 127–28. 
29 Id. at 133. 
30 COHEN, 2 PEOPLE’S CHINA, supra note 11, at 933. 
31 STEVEN TSANG, A MODERN HISTORY OF HONG KONG 5 (2004). 
32 Id. at 5–7. 
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in British factories in Canton.33  In the words of British Foreign Secretary 
Palmerston, the war was meant “to efface an unjust and humiliating act, to 
recover the value of certain property plus expenses . . . and almost by and 
by to put England’s relations with the Middle Kingdom on a new and 
proper footing.”34 
Arguably, the Treaty of Nanking, signed by the British and 
Chinese governments in 1842 upon the cessation of hostilities, did indeed 
place Anglo-Sino relations on “a new and proper footing,” albeit an 
inherently controversial footing, with Britain assuming a position of 
power that the Qing Emperor Qianlong of some forty years earlier would 
not have thought possible.  The Chinese, in fact, would suggest that the 
Treaty of Nanking was the first of the so-called unequal treaties that 
Western powers entered into with China during the nineteenth century.  
Aside from the agreement’s longstanding importance of ushering in a 
wave of unequal treaties and subordinating Chinese politics, culture, law, 
and society to those of its Western counterparts, the favorable trade terms 
granted to the British and the cession of Hong Kong Island to Britain 
proved the two most immediately significant results of Nanking.  The first 
article of the treaty stipulated that the Chinese had to abolish the practice 
of “compell[ing] the British merchants trading at Canton to deal 
exclusively with certain Chinese merchants” at Canton and “all [other] 
ports where British merchants may reside, and to permit them to carry on 
their mercantile transactions with whatever persons they please.”35  The 
second article allowed “that British subjects, with their families and 
establishments, shall be allowed to reside, for the purposes of carrying on 
their mercantile pursuits, without molestation or restraint, at the cities and 
towns of Canton, Amoy, Foochow-fu, Ningpo, and Shanghai.”36  The 
British government would in turn appoint: 
 
Superintendants, or Consular officers, to reside at each of 
the above-named cities or towns, to be the medium of 
communication between the Chinese authorities and the 
said merchants, and to see that the just duties and other 
dues of the Chinese Government . . . are duly discharged 
by Her Britannic Majesty’s subjects.37 
 
This clause clearly illustrates the growing economic and political presence 
that Britain physically exercised in China.  Moreover, the terms 
underscored that Britain would control all British trade in China, with the 
                                                 
33 Id. at 9–10. 
34 Id. at 11 (spoken to Rear Admiral Sir George Elliott). 
35 Treaty of Nanking, art. V, U.K.-China, Aug. 29, 1842. 
36 Id. art II. 
37 Id. 
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Chinese operating as a mere appendage, informed of trade relations by 
British middlemen.  Further articles, such as Article X’s provision that all 
Chinese ports “be thrown open for the resort of British merchants, [and] a 
fair and regular tariff of export and import customs and other dues 
[promulgated],” also promised healthful economic terms for Britain.38 
Article III of the Treaty of Nanking became by far the most 
important article for both Britain’s continued presence in China and the 
Kwok-a-Sing affair.  Given the increased presence Britain would exercise 
economically and politically in China, it proved “obviously necessary and 
desirable that British subjects should have some port where at they may 
[maintain] and refit their ships when required, and keep stores for that 
purpose.”39  Accordingly, “his Majesty the Emperor of China cedes to Her 
Majesty the Queen of Great Britain & Ireland, the Island of Hong-Kong, 
to be possessed in perpetuity by Her Britannic Majesty, her heirs and 
successors.”40  With the stroke of a fountain pen, Hong Kong Island 
became a Crown Colony.  It would become one of the richest cities in the 
world and stand as a jewel in the crown of empire until its reversion to 
China in 1997.  Yet political and legal control served as prerequisites to 
amassing such wealth, as an ordered, stable society assured traders and 
speculators that their investments would be honored.41  Article III proved 
tantamount to ensuring such control, as it asserted that Hong Kong “be 
governed by such laws and regulations as Her Majesty the Queen of Great 
Britain & Ireland shall see fit to direct.”42 
Importantly, Article III made no stipulation about what type of 
government or administrative apparatus Hong Kong would have, but it 
clearly ensured that the English common law, in the grand tradition of 
Coke and Blackstone, would extend once more beyond the shores of 
Albion and enlighten an indigenous outpost, bringing civility and stability 
along with it.  The explicit reference to law in Article III signifies the 
import Britain placed upon the law as a mechanism of building its empire 
and consolidating its wealth and power.43  The carte blanche nature of 
Article III enabled colonial administrators in Hong Kong to erect courts 
and promulgate laws that would define the Kwok-a-Sing decision and 
further subordinate China’s role in the international order.  The Treaty of 
Nanking, therefore, laid the foundation for future Anglo-Sino relations by 
placing the Chinese in a politically and legally inferior position.44 
                                                 
38 Id. art. X. 
39 Id. art. III. 
40 Id. 
41 TSANG, supra note 31, at 19–20. 
42 Treaty of Nanking, supra note 35, art. III. 
43  A further discussion of this assertion follows in the following section on legal 
imperialism; see infra notes 45–50 and accompanying text. 
44 For a further discussion of how Britain subordinated China, see generally Cohen, 
Chinese Attitudes, supra note 15, at 284–85.  See also WESLEY R. FISHEL, THE END OF 
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Britain’s role in shaping and molding the Treaty of Nanking as 
well as future unequal treaties that ultimately affected the Kwok-a-Sing 
cases highlights the role of legal imperialism in Anglo intervention in 
nineteenth-century China.  The articulation of legal imperialism first 
resulted in jurisprudential and political science debates of the mid-to-late 
twentieth century, an era that saw the final collapse of the European 
imperial order as numerous African, Asian, and Middle Eastern nations 
declared their independence.  Scholars such as Theodore Becker, Sandra 
Burman, Barbara Harrell-Bond, Konrad Zweigert, Hein Kotz, and Martin 
Shapiro advanced the concept, though one of the most fluid, clear 
discussions of legal imperialism is John Schmidhauser’s “Legal 
imperialism: Its Enduring Impact on Colonial and Post-Colonial Judicial 
Systems.”45  Schmidhauser defines the basic theory of legal imperialism as 
one where conquering powers universally imposed law upon the 
indigenous population in an effort to maintain civil stability and order, 
consolidate economic penetration, and ensure that the invocation of 
indigenous law by the native population did not threaten the authority and 
power of the conqueror.46  Unsurprisingly, legal imperialism is frequently 
connoted with European law, whether civil or common, as imbued upon 
colonial societies of “the Other.”47 
Despite the relatively recent exploration of the theory, case studies 
have demonstrated the longevity of its actual practice.48  In regards to 
Britain, its incursions into Ireland during the mid-sixteenth century laid 
the foundations for all future legal imperialist endeavors employed 
throughout its empire between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries.49  
In Ireland, Britain legitimized its colonization by harkening both to 
England’s common law tradition and the canon law of conquest and 
warfare as developed by Continental powers and applied to non-
                                                                                                               
EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN CHINA 7–11 (1993) (providing a dissection of how Western 
powers subordinated China with the terms of the Nanking Treaty). 
45 John R. Schmidhauser, Legal Imperialism: Its Enduring Impact on Colonial and Post-
Colonial Judicial Systems, 13 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 321–34 (July 1992). 
46 Id. at 328. 
47 “Othering” or defining people as “the Other” began in the writings of GWF Hegel in the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  According to Denys Hays, European 
imperialists quickly latched upon the concept as a way of identifying themselves as against 
“the Other” non-Europeans (or non-Westerners).  See generally DENYS HAY, EUROPE: THE 
EMERGENCE OF AN IDEA 122 (2nd ed. 1968) (making “the Other” commensurate with “the 
idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European 
peoples and cultures”).  Edward Said expanded upon this definition in his seminal 
Orientalism, in which he suggested, “there is in addition the hegemony of European ideas 
about the Orient, themselves reiterating European superiority over Oriental backwardness.”  
EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM 7 (1979). 
48 See, e.g., ALLAN CHRISTELOW, MUSLIM LAW COURTS AND THE FRENCH COLONIAL STATE 
IN ALGERIA (1985); HANS S. PAWLISCH, SIR JOHN DAVIES AND THE CONQUEST OF IRELAND: 
A STUDY IN LEGAL IMPERIALISM (1985). 
49 PAWLISCH, supra note 48, at 35. 
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Europeans between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries.50  Thus, the 
frequent assertion that Ireland was Britain’s “laboratory for empire” is not 
without merit. 
In a macroscopic sense, Britain’s utilization of other, Western 
legal traditions, such as Roman law and canon law, to justify imperialism 
illustrated the widespread tendency of European powers to borrow from 
various Western legal theories, traditions, and customs when justifying 
their incursions into non-European, or in the case of Ireland, “uncivilized,” 
territories. Indeed, the series of unequal treaties that the great European 
powers, including Britain, France, and Russia, executed with China and 
Japan in the nineteenth century demonstrates this reliance on a blended, 
Western European legal tradition imposed on the barbarous “Other.” 
Britain proved by far the most likely Western nation to unleash its 
domestic common law on its colonies and “spheres of influence” while 
simultaneously relying upon Roman law to justify the incursions.51  Yet 
other Western powers similarly implemented the late medieval/early 
modern model of the canon law of warfare and conquest to validate the 
destruction and replacement of non-European, indigenous legal societies.52  
Such Euro-centric legal views and the universal reliance by Western 
powers on the Judeo-Christian legal tradition in effectuating and 
legitimizing their conquest of non-European cultures clearly indicates the 
assumption from the signing of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 until 
Treaty of Versailles in 1918 that Western law proved the only law worthy 
enough to govern international relations.  During this long span of 
European legal and political dominance, China negotiated and engaged 
with the West.  Legal imperialism, therefore, dictated the inferior position 
from which China interacted with the Euro-centric legal order.  In a more 
immediate context, it also illustrated how British courts, from a politically 
and legally superior position, manipulated the Kwok-a-Sing cases for 
Britain’s own political gain. 
 Indeed, the vast legal machinery of the British Empire levied itself 
upon Kwok-a-Sing in early 1871, thereby beginning a two year drama that 
ultimately solidified Britain’s preeminence in China.  Records remain 
                                                 
50 Id. at 37.  In his study, Pawlisch suggested that the civil law of conquest derived from 
Roman law traditions.  The Catholic Church built upon such traditions in the thirteenth 
century when it in turn established the canon law of warfare and conquest.  In turn, 
Continental powers between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries developed this 
Roman and canon law tradition of warfare and conquest into civil, Continental standards.  
The resulting canons held that barbarous and inferior peoples were subject to conquest and 
reform.  Continental powers then applied such norms to barbarous, uncivilized, non-
Europeans.  England modified the civil law standard slightly in arguing that the Irish, 
despite their white appearances, were “barbarous and inferior” to the English. 
51 John Schmidhauser, Power, Legal Imperialism, and Diplomacy, 23 L. & SOC. REV. 875 
(1989). 
52 Id. 
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unclear, but sometime in late 1870 or early 1871, British authorities 
arrested Kwok-a-Sing in Hong Kong as “a suspicious character and a 
person dangerous to the peace and good order of the colony.” 53  On 
February 7, 1871, Kwok-a-Sing appeared before Charles May, a 
magistrate judge in Hong Kong, who duly convicted the coolie for his 
actions onboard La Nouvelle Pénélope. 54   In delivering the verdict, 
however, May noted a communication that he had received that very 
morning from the Chinese government in Canton. 55   The missive 
requested that “the rendition of [Kwok-a-Sing] . . . as a subject of China, 
who has committed certain crimes and offences against the laws of China 
by participating in the murder of a portion of the crew of the French ship 
Nouvelle Pénélope.”56 
The extradition request and relevant law consulted by May in his 
proceedings derived from Hong Kong Ordinance No. 2 of 1850, itself a 
product of provisions governing extradition between China and British 
Hong Kong in the Treaty of the Bogue, signed on October 8, 1843, and, 
later, the Treaty of Tientsin, executed on June 29, 1858.57  This basic 
structure of treaties and ordinances, all of which featured favorable terms 
for the British, underscored the British Establishment’s imperialist agenda 
in China as legitimized by legal means.  Indeed, the ordinance and treaties 
granted British authorities sole control over extraditions without extending 
Chinese officials the opportunity to consult with subjects imprisoned in 
Hong Kong.  Both contemporary Chinese government officials and 
modern British, American, and Chinese scholars have derided the Treaty 
of the Bogue and the Treaty of Tientsin as part of the great canon of 
unequal treaties that helped to fuel the century of humiliation.58 
A cursory glance at the language of the treaties and the ordinance 
that became such central features of the Kwok-a-Sing matter indicated the 
increasingly imperialist, inequitable tone of the laws.  Article IX of the 
Treaty of the Bogue ensured the extraditions of both Chinese and British 
subjects from the other’s territory if an individual had committed a crime 
and taken refuge there.59  As the article made clear, 
 
                                                 
53 Kwok-a-Sing, supra note 1, at 181. 
54 Id. at 182. 
55 Id. at 181. 
56 Id. at 182. 
57 Hong Kong Ordinance No. 2, supra note 9; The Treaty of the Bogue, U.K.-China, Oct. 8, 
1843 (Supplementary Treaty between China and Great Britain, signed at Hoomun-Chae, 
October 8 1843); The Treaty of Tientsin, U.K.-China, June 29, 1858 (Treaty of Peace, 
Friendship, and Commerce, between Great Britain and China, signed at Tianjin, June 26, 
1858). 
58 FISHEL, supra note 44, at 2–6. 
59 Treaty of the Bogue, supra note 57, at art. IX (“In neither case shall concealment or 
refuge be afforded[.]”). 
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if lawless natives of China, having committed crimes or 
offences against their own Government, shall flee to Hong 
Kong, or to the English ships of war, or English merchant 
ships, for refuge, they shall, if discovered by the English 
officers, be handed over at once to the Chinese officers for 
trial and punishment.60 
 
Similarly, Article IX granted that: 
 
if any soldier or sailor, or any other person, whatever his 
caste or country, who is a subject of the Crown of England, 
shall, from any cause or on any pretence, desert, fly, or 
escape into the Chinese territory, such solider or sailor, or 
other person, shall be apprehended and confined by the 
Chinese Authorities, and sent to the nearest British 
Consular or other Government officer.61 
 
The terms of the treaty thus indicated that a level of reciprocity 
applied to citizens of both countries.  Yet equally important, the treaties 
contained the somewhat suggestive, and indeed patronizing, language of 
both class and conquest favored by the British Establishment.62  Certainly, 
the treaty provisions, in theory, applied equally to all British subjects.  Yet 
explicit references to soldiers, sailors, and “others,” coupled with sureties 
that one’s “caste” or “country” of birth did not preclude them from the 
treaty’s terms, indicated how prominent Britons conceived of conquest as 
a class-based, socio-economic right.63  Their duties to protect British 
subjects merely underscored the generally paternalistic air of the treaties. 
Yet just fifteen years later, such reciprocal terms had all but 
evaporated in the Treaty of Tientsin, which abrogated the Treaty of the 
Bogue and its provisions.64  No term within the treaty’s fifty-six articles 
discussed the extradition of British fugitives who had fled to China, a 
perplexing occurrence given the seeming disadvantage at which it placed 
Britain in exercising its legal might.65  Despite this omission, however, 
Article XXI stipulated in a masterful display of strident rhetoric that “if 
criminals, subjects of China, shall take refuge in Hongkong, or on board 
                                                 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 PAWLISCH, supra note 48, at 12. 
63 For a Marxist interpretation of British imperialist history that discusses this theory in far 
greater depth, see Mark F. Proudman, Words for Scholars: The Semantics of ‘Imperialism’, 
8 J. HIST. SOC. 395, 401 (2008).  See generally A.J.P. TAYLOR, ESSAYS IN ENGLISH 
HISTORY 30–32 (1976). 
64 Treaty of Tientsin, supra note 57. 
65 There has not been any explanation tendered for why the Treaty of the Bogue failed to 
provide an explicit extradition clause referring to British citizens found in China. 
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the British ships there, they shall, upon due requisition by the Chinese 
authorities, be searched for, and, on proof of their guilt, be delivered up.”66  
This provision similarly applied to any Chinese “criminal” who concealed 
himself in a house or ship in other British ports in China. 67   The 
categorization of the Chinese as criminals even before a court of law 
determined their guilt or innocence reflected the disdain of the British 
towards the Chinese.68  The construction of the Chinese as criminals 
indicated that traditional legal customs enshrined in the English common 
law, such as the presumption of innocence before a showing of one’s guilt, 
did not have a place in Britain’s colonial rhetoric in China.  Furthermore, 
as the treaty language suggested, many British officials feared that Hong 
Kong had become a “refuge” for Chinese criminals during the mid-
nineteenth century, thereby contributing to a general degradation of the 
Crown Colony’s society.69  Thus, by providing for the extradition of 
criminals, the Victorian propriety that permeated Britain and its colonies 
throughout the nineteenth century would remain intact. 
By far the most immediate and important law governing the 
extradition of Chinese subjects who had fled to Hong Kong was Hong 
Kong Ordinance No. 2 of 1850.70  Ordinance No. 2, promulgated after the 
Treaty of the Bogue but before Tientsin, effectively set forth the 
procedural mechanisms required for “the rendition for trial to officers of 
their own country of such subjects of China as have committed crimes or 
offences against their own Government, and afterwards taken refuge in 
Hong Kong.”71  In a foreshadowing of the Treaty of Tientsin, Ordinance 
No. 2 did not apply to British subjects who committed crimes in violation 
of British law and had taken refuge in China, but rather, applied solely to 
Chinese subjects who had fled to Hong Kong.  To render its dissolute 
citizen homeward, Chinese officials had to issue a communication to 
 
any magistrate or Court (other than the Supreme Court) 
desiring the arrest of any person being a Chinese subject, 
and then within the said colony of Hong Kong, and 
alleging that such a person has committed, or is charged 
                                                 
66 Treaty of Tientsin, supra note 57, art. XXI. 
67 Id. 
68 Although it is possible that the provision merely refers to those Chinese subjects who 
had been tried and convicted in Chinese courts, explanatory notes do not exist to clarify.  
Moreover, as will be discussed, infra, given that Kwok-a-Sing was arrested pursuant to 
Article IX without having been tried in China, there is likely little merit to the contention 
that the colonial administration in Hong Kong acknowledged a Chinese judgment as 
“proof of guilt.” 
69 Kwok-a-Sing, supra note 1, at 198. 
70 Hong Kong Ordinance No. 2, supra note 9. 
71 Id. 
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with having committed any crime or offence against the 
laws of China. 72 
 
Upon receipt of the extradition request, a magistrate in Hong 
Kong conducted an investigation to determine the nationality of the 
accused and whether he had potentially violated any Chinese law.  If these 
two criteria were fulfilled, the magistrate issued an arrest warrant, and the 
accused appeared before the court for an official determination of whether 
the individual “is a subject of China, and that there is probable cause for 
believing that the said person has committed such crime or offence” in 
violation of Chinese laws.73  If so,  
 
it shall and may be lawful for such magistrate or Court to 
commit such person for safe custody to prison, and to 
direct the gaoler to detain such person in prison until the 
said gaoler shall receive some order or orders from the 
Governor of Hong Kong relative to the further detention, 
discharge, or transmission of such person to the nearest 
Chinese authorities.74 
 
Despite the inherent inequality of the treaties, Hong Kong 
Ordinance No. 2 indicated that a rigorous standard existed to initiate 
extradition proceedings, indicative of the high esteem in which British 
authorities held the law as a means of regulating order at home and abroad.  
The texts of the treaties suggested that Britain had a vested interest in 
depopulating Hong Kong of unwanted, troublesome, and criminal Chinese 
but would not reciprocate in extradition by the signing of Tientsin.75   
Yet the stringent standards of Ordinance No. 2 reflected the 
inferior position from which the Chinese government operated within the 
British imperial landscape.  The Chinese had to take the first, affirmative 
step and issue an arrest warrant to a British judge for an individual they 
suspected of criminal acts.  The Anglo magistrate, by English—not 
Chinese—standards, then determined whether he believed the person was 
a Chinese subject and had violated a Chinese law, a daring measure given 
that English judges in Hong Kong received no legal training in Chinese 
legal standards, as the Privy Council would later note in its Kwok-a-Sing 
judgment.76  Only after this initial hearing would British officials consider 
arresting the individual and officially charging him with a crime by 
repeating the entire process.  Such bureaucratic extradition proceedings 
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were not de rigeur throughout the British system, as Pigott’s 
“Extraterritoriality: the law relating to consular jurisdiction and residence 
in Oriental countries” highlighted that the Kwok-a-Sing process was 
anomalous to Anglo-Oriental relations.77  Thus, between both the Anglo-
centric proceedings for extradition and the needlessly protracted initial 
hearings required to issue an arrest warrant and determine guilt, the British 
could assert their dominance in Hong Kong, thereby illustrating to the 
Chinese that the United Kingdom, and not the Middle Kingdom, 
controlled the fates of Chinese citizens in the territory. 
IV. THE FIRST EXTRADITION PROCEEDING 
Against this backdrop, Magistrate Charles May applied Ordinance 
No. 2 in a most impartial manner and granted China’s request for 
extradition.  This indicated that British officials in Hong Kong adhered to 
the legal framework established by the ordinances and treaties, and did not 
abrogate the law in an effort to infuriate Chinese officials and assert 
British superiority in the region, regardless of the overall equality of 
extradition law.  Magistrate May noted that: 
 
upon investigation of the case, . . . there is cause to believe 
that the said Defendant is a subject of China, and has 
committed the said crimes against the laws of China by 
feloniously seizing the said ship at sea, and by murdering 
the captain and certain of the crew of the said ship on the 
4th October last past at sea.78 
 
Moreover, “after the commission of the said crime [Kwok-a-Sing] 
did feloniously seize a boat belonging to the said ship and land at a place 
called Pakha, in Chinese territory on the 11th of October.”79  By May’s 
estimation, Kwok-a-Sing’s actions clearly warranted extradition to China 
in accordance with Ordinance No. 2 of 1850, and he accordingly 
commanded the superintendent of the Gaol of Victoria “to receive the said 
Defendant into your custody in the said gaol, and there to imprison him . . . 
pending the receipt of orders from His Excellency the Lieutenant-
Governor as to his further disposal.” 80 
What happened next changed the nature of In re Kwok-a-Sing 
from a typical extradition proceeding to a clash between members of the 
Western legal order in both Hong Kong and London that ultimately 
resulted in the solidification of British colonial authority in the Crown 
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colony and East Asia.  Immediately after Kwok-a-Sing departed to 
Victoria Gaol to await his extradition to China, Kwok-a-Sing’s lawyer 
submitted a writ of habeas corpus to discharge the coolie into the Crown 
colony.  Sir John Smale, the cantankerous Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court of Hong Kong and passionate advocate for the improved status and 
rights of coolies, approved the writ and in the process set off a fire-storm 
of opinion throughout the Western world as to the “correctness” of his 
action.81  Appointed Attorney General of Hong Kong in 1861 and Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court five years later, Smale seized upon his 
elevation to the bench to campaign against the amalgamation of the legal 
profession, encroachment of the executive branch, gambling, social abuses, 
and most importantly, instances of perceived slavery in Southeast Asia.82   
The coolie trade had by this time become “a new form of slavery,” 
as the great Western powers, still in need of cheap labor but unable to 
maintain slavery, increasingly relied upon colonial agents stationed in 
European ports throughout Asia and the subcontinent to coerce the 
indigenous population onto Western vessels bound for other destinations 
in Asia, Europe, North America, and the Caribbean.83  Abolitionists and 
proto-human rights activists deplored the miserable conditions suffered by 
coolies, including malnourishment, cramped conditions aboard the ships, 
and hard labor in fields, factories, and railroad construction.  In fact, the 
word “coolie” originated from a Hindi/Urdu word in Britain’s wealthiest 
colony of India meaning “day laborer,” while the Chinese equivalent, 苦
力 (“ku-li”), translated to “bitterly hard [use of] strength.”84  As an activist 
in stark opposition to the coolie trade, Smale granted the habeas petition, 
which, unsurprisingly, the Attorney General of Hong Kong immediately 
challenged.  In a dramatic irony appealing to a Greek tragedian, Chief 
Justice Smale presided over the hearing. 
On March 29, 1871, the champion of the coolies delivered his 
judgment, a rambling, emotional thirteen page opinion of the crabbed-
letter variety common in the nineteenth century. 85   Smale used the 
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opportunity more as a platform to advocate the abolition of the coolie 
trade than to resolve legal questions of Empire, arguing that La Nouvelle 
Pénélope was a slave ship as proven by depositions. He alternately 
deplored the ship and its barracoons as “a slave warehouse, or an incolsure 
where slaves are quartered,” and stated that “between twenty and thirty of 
the coolies who were on the lower deck were crying, and exclaiming they 
had been kidnapped.”86  In a stark departure from the legal questions of 
piracy that both Smale and the Privy Council would later consider, the 
Chief Justice stridently suggested that in fact the French crew of La 
Nouvelle Pénélope was guilty of piracy, not the Chinese coolies who 
commandeered the vessel, as the Frenchman held “these poor fellows . . . 
piratically as slaves.”87 
Given Smale’s personal predisposition against the coolie trade and 
slavery, he accordingly tailored his legal arguments to ensure the freedom 
of Kwok-a-Sing. In doing so, he carefully crafted a judgment that 
undermined the hitherto expanding British power in the colony’s laws and 
courts.88  Smale suggested that since the Treaty of the Bogue, which had 
laid the groundwork for Ordinance No. 2 of 1850, ceased “to be in force, 
the provisions for rendition under it are to cease.”89  Accordingly, “this 
construction must be adopted as to the Ordinance No. 2 of 1850, and that 
its operation ceased when the Treaty of the Bogue was first suspended and 
then absolutely abrogated.”90  Smale astutely noted that the Treaty of 
Tientsin of 1858 “differed very much in detail from the Bogue Treaty” as 
to its extradition proceedings, as the latter failed to include a provision 
dealing with the extradition process.91  The Treaty of the Bogue, of course, 
had yielded Ordinance No. 2 to outline extradition criteria, but Smale 
reasoned that Ordinance No. 2 was null and void given the abrogation of 
the Treaty of the Bogue.92  He accordingly demanded that if the imperial 
authorities wanted to engage in extradition, the Hong Kong legislature 
first promulgate a new ordinance to render suspects, given Ordinance No. 
2 moot status.93 
Smale proceeded to turn the remainder of the opinion into a clever 
hybrid between legal argument and political manifesto, suggesting that 
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murder was not the relevant crime at issue, but rather, “the crime, if 
anything, is piracy, and being justiciable here [in Hong Kong], if there be 
any crime, there is no ground for giving up the man.”94  Smale’s argument 
illustrated a preference for undermining the colonial order by abrogating 
the prior ordinance and decrying the named crime as irrelevant.  Moreover, 
his judgment indicated that Smale did not actually believe a crime had 
occurred, as he further wrote: 
 
the prisoner was beyond question under unlawful 
coercion . . . [and] it is to me clear that according to 
English law a man under unlawful restrain of his personal 
liberty at sea, as well as on shore, has a right to take life to 
free himself from such constraint on his personal liberty.95 
 
Yet even if a crime, whether murder or piracy, had occurred, 
Smale steadfastly refused to extradite Kwok-a-Sing on two additional 
grounds. The first, purely legal ground saw the Chief Justice reasoning 
that the “right to rendition is confined to crimes committed within the 
country demanding it,” but given that that “the crime ‘charged’ was an act 
[of murder] committed on the high seas, and also on board what is said to 
be a French ship,” China did not have the right to demand extradition 
“because the crime, murder, for which rendition is said to be claimed, was 
committed at sea, and not in China.”96  Although this resolved the issue in 
a purely legal framework, it may well appear as a blow to the Chinese. 
Yet later in Smale’s opinion, the Chief Justice hinted at an 
additional motivation for refusing to extradite Kwok-a-Sing on the murder 
charge. In June 1870, some four months before the incident aboard La 
Nouvelle Pénélope, a series of kidnappings involving young children 
spread across China. 97   The culprits were assumed to be Catholic 
missionaries active in “recruiting” children, frequently with financial 
incentives to the children’s families, to the Roman cause.98  Chinese 
officials met with their French counterparts, who had assumed 
responsibility and control of all Catholic missionary work in China 
following the Second Opium War, in the city of Tientsin on June 19.99  A 
vituperative crowd of local Chinese gathered at the meeting and an 
eruption of violence ensued, leading to the deaths of thirty to forty local 
converts, twenty-one Europeans, and both the French consular officer and 
                                                 
94 Id. at 198. 
95 Id. at 201. 
96 Id. 
97 J.K. Fairbank, Patterns Behind the Tientsin Massacre, 20 HARV. J. ASIA STUD. 480, 503 
(Dec. 1957). 
98 Id. at 504. 
99 Id. at 489–90. 
180 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW    [Vol. 7 
 
his advisor.100  Relations soured between France and China, and they 
became increasingly strained between China and other Western powers 
following the Massacre of Tientsin. 
Smale, fully aware of this incident, stated in the closing of his 
judgment that some sixteen of Kwok-a-Sing’s fellow coolies aboard La 
Nouvelle Pénélope had not been so fortunate to escape to Hong Kong, but 
rather had fled to China where local officials, “all being under the order of 
the French consul at Canton” beheaded their own countrymen for their 
actions on La Nouvelle Pénélope.101  Smale quite clearly saw this action as 
retribution not only for the murder of the Frenchman aboard La Nouvelle 
Pénélope, but also, in a larger sense, as revenge for the massacre of 
French and other European officials and missionaries at Tientsin eight 
months earlier.  In his monumental closing, Smale articulated the 
deteriorating political situation between China and the West, his vehement 
opposition towards Western motivations in China, and Kwok-a-Sing’s 
symbolic role in the drama.  “The rendition of the prisoner now before me, 
Kwok-a-Sing, has been asked doubtless in order that he may be added as 
one more [executed],” the Chief Justice wrote, “and so that one by one, 
and at length a great hecatomb of vengeance may be completed on China 
land—a lasting monument of the humanity, of the Christianity, of western 
civilization.”102  The irony in Smale’s eyes was not the Chinese inability 
to provide a fair trial, but rather that the French, who controlled the region 
of China to which Kwok-a-Sing faced extradition, would seek retribution, 
not justice.  Western, civilized, Christian France would instead execute the 
coolie out of that basest of human motivations, revenge. 
Smale continued his strategy of using a legal ground and 
combining it with dire political and societal warnings in his second basis 
for refusing extradition. The Chief Justice noted that “it is beyond doubt 
that political criminals are not to be given up [and] within the letter of the 
treaty [of Tientsin], neither is a Chinese subject to be given up if 
justiciable here, e.g., for piracy.”103  By casting Kwok-a-Sing and his band 
of coolies as political prisoners, Smale helped to turn the conflict from a 
mere legal dispute over the hijacking of a European ship and the murder 
of its crew on the high seas to one that involved both political and legal 
questions.  By making such a move, as the Chief Justice noted later in his 
opinion, “I hope that this matter will be, as I believe it will certainly be, 
duly investigated in Europe.” 104   Moreover, Smale had turned the 
inherently unequal treaties upside down, by reasoning that Article XXI of 
the Treaty of Tientsin ensured that Chinese subjects would not face 
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extradition to China if the crime for which they were charged was also a 
crime justiciable in Hong Kong.  Murder, and piracy, given its 
international status, both constituted crimes within Hong Kong’s 
jurisdiction.  The wily Chief Justice had thus won his legal victory by 
simultaneously decrying the legal imperialist framework instituted by 
Britain in China while simultaneously using those same laws and treaties 
against the British Establishment. 
As important as the resolution of legal questions and their political 
affects in Smale’s judgment proved, the Chief Justice’s language and 
appeal to liberal ideals also highlighted the subordinate role that China 
occupied in world affairs.  In addition to his aforementioned criticism of 
the West’s position in China, Smale cast the Chinese as “slaves” to 
Europeans.105   In a reinforcement of liberal political philosophies as 
espoused by John Locke’s social contract and the French motto liberté, 
egalité, fraternité during the eighteenth century, Smale argued that the 
“piracy” of the coolie slaves aboard La Nouvelle Pénélope was justifiable, 
as “the first law of nature, the right of self-preservation, of liberty equally 
with life, which is fully sustained by text-books and cases” demanded that 
the coolies revolt.106  He added further legal substance to his compelling 
prose and syntax by effectively illustrating how the British had imported 
English legal mechanisms, including the common law, depositions, and 
testimony before a judge and jury, to assert their dominance over Chinese 
defendants in Hong Kong courts.  Yet Smale took these hallmarks of 
British justice and, just as he had effectively subverted the treaties of the 
Bogue and Tientsin in his earlier remarks, suggested that, 
 
however horrible was the scene of contest, and the 
carnage on board La Nouvelle Pénélope, the depositions 
disclose such acts of enslavement, and of illegal coercion 
on the part of the captain and his agents, all the testimony 
being ex parte out of the mouths of the coerced or hostile 
witnesses for the prosecution, as show that there was no 
violence or robbery beyond what was absolutely 
necessary to regain liberty.107 
   
This quest for liberty, as demonstrated by English depositions and 
testimony, clearly demonstrated “that this prisoner, Kwok-a-Sing, was 
guilty of no offence whatever cognizable by English law.”108  Smale, 
therefore, radically departed from the Victorian status quo of worshipping 
Britain’s expansive empire in his damnation of the Western legal and 
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political hegemony in China.  Yet he also revealed himself as a standard 
Victorian gentleman in his patronizing defense of the coolies’ actions 
against their imperial oppressors. 
V. A SHOCKWAVE OF REACTION, AND A SECOND ARREST AND 
EXTRADITION PROCEEDING 
Smale’s important subversion of British and Western legal 
principles, in combination with the decision and legal reasoning of his 
judgment, was sure to provoke a reaction throughout the Western world.  
And so it did.  American consular officials and diplomats, undoubtedly 
sensitive to the United States’ own tumultuous relationship with slavery 
that had ceased a mere six years earlier with the end of the Civil War, 
expressed high praise for Smale’s decision.  As the United States consular 
official D.H. Bailey noted to one Mr. Davis of the State Department in 
Washington, D.C., “I have said the decision is remarkable, and it is, first 
because in effect it declares that ships employed in the Macao trade are 
engaged in piracy; second, that such ships are slave-ships engaged in the 
slave trade.”109  Bailey also expressed hope that “if Great Britain sustains 
the decision of Chief Justice Smale, the Macao coolie trade, with all its 
enormities, will be at an end.”110  Yet Bailey allowed that such a decision 
would disrupt an “exceedingly profitable” trade for Britain and the 
Western powers, a consequence not welcome by many in the political or 
economic realms of the time.111 
Equally important in Bailey’s letter are manifestations of the same 
patronization towards the coolies and Chinese found in Smale’s judgment, 
however favorable both men’s opinions of the Chinese and abolition of 
the coolie trade. Indeed, Bailey commented “that the whole coolie trade of 
China, at Macao, Hong-Kong, and elsewhere is so full of fraud and all 
sorts of iniquity as to make necessary some such startling decision to 
arouse Western civilization to a sense of its duty concerning this new and 
infamous slave trade.”112  Bailey’s sentiment touched upon the same 
strand and belief inherent with Smale’s judgment that the West, in all of 
its enlightened thought and liberal values, owed a duty to the Chinese and 
the voiceless coolies to abolish the trade. The Chinese alone could not halt 
this problem, the thinking went; it required the intervention of Western 
judges and Western politicians, schooled in Hobbesian rhetoric and 
Enlightenment thought as espoused by Rousseau, Voltaire, and 
Montesquieu. Such a belief system, however well-intended, served as one 
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additional element that contributed to the century of humiliation suffered 
by China at the hands of the West. 
In sharp juxtaposition to the Americans’ delight at Smale’s 
decision stood the displeasure of the formidable British Empire. By 1870, 
Albion’s seed had spread across the globe, stretching far beyond its early 
plantations in Ireland to the salt mines of India, the rainforests of Uganda, 
and the silk fields of China. The rainy archipelago in the North Atlantic 
whose landmass totaled 84,556 square miles had acquired an empire 
spanning some 10,000,000 square miles.113  Over 500 million people owed 
allegiance to Her Majesty the Queen, nestled away in Victorian luxuries at 
Whitehall in London, the pulsating center of the empire upon which the 
sun did not set. Also at Whitehall sat the Privy Council, the court of last 
resort for Britain and its innumerable colonies. A decision such as that 
reached by Sir John Smale in Kwok-a-Sing may have seemed insignificant 
if viewed solely within the context of Kwok-a-Sing’s personal battle. But 
when considering Smale’s subversive legal reasoning, subliminal 
messages, and strident rhetoric, the judgment had the ability to undermine 
the foundations of an empire. 
Indeed, the imperialist position worsened following Smale’s 
judgment. Between Kwok-a-Sing’s arrest on February 7, 1871 and 
Smale’s decision on March 29, the French government, as the government 
of the slain captain and crew of La Nouvelle Pénélope, sought to extradite 
Kwok-a-Sing from British authorities in Hong Kong.114  After Smale’s 
judgment, however, and perhaps in testament to its strength, the French 
consul abandoned his claim.115  Still committed to seeing justice served, 
the Attorney General of Hong Kong seized upon Smale’s remarks that 
piracy constituted the only possible charge with which to try Kwok-a-Sing 
and sought another arrest warrant charging Kwok-a-Sing with piracy ex 
jure gentium in the magistracy court of Charles May.  May issued the 
warrant and determined that probable cause existed to charge that Kwok-
a-Sing “piratically and feloniously did make an assault [on] the said ship, 
and the apparel and tackle of the said ship, [and] feloniously and violently 
did steal, take, and carry away” La Nouvelle Pénélope after “feloniously 
and willfully, and of their malice aforethought, kill and murder the said 
[crew].”116  May accordingly committed Kwok-a-Sing to the gaol to await 
“trial for the said offence at the next Criminal Sessions of the Supreme 
Court.”117 
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Ironically, Chief Justice Smale presided over the trial on May 10, 
1871. Unsurprisingly, he discharged Kwok-a-Sing, but disposed of the 
case on a purely legal (and uncharacteristically pithy) basis, not discussing 
piracy and its legality at all, but rather holding that the second arrest for 
piracy ex jure gentium violated section 6 of the Habeas Corpus Act.118  
The act provided that: 
 
[N]o person or persons which shall be delivered or set at 
large upon any habeas corpus, shall at any time hereafter 
be again imprisoned or committed for the same 
offence . . . other than by the legal order and process of 
such court wherein he or they shall be bound by 
recognizance to appear, or other court having jurisdiction 
of the cause.119 
 
Smale suggested that the offence mentioned in both the February 
7 and May 10 warrants “is one and the same, and no other.”120  He further 
noted that May’s magistracy court did not constitute a real court, but 
rather acted as a place of “preliminary inquiry.”121  The Habeas Corpus 
Act’s intended “court with jurisdiction” was that of the trial court, indeed, 
Chief Justice Smale’s court.  Smale, in yet another subversion of the 
British justice system, discharged Kwok-a-Sing. 
VI. AT THE HEART OF EMPIRE: THE PRIVY COUNCIL RENDERS 
JUDGMENT 
Smale’s political calculations and subtle legal scheming met a 
formidable foe in the Privy Council, which accepted an appeal of the 
matter less than two years later.  In rendering its decision Attorney-
General of Hong Kong v. Kwok-a-Sing, the Council proved equally adept 
at legal sophistry and artful political subterfuge by reading the law in 
terms favorable to Britain and the Western legal order, and constructing 
the Chinese as politically, culturally, and legally inferior.  The Privy 
Council enjoyed a legal and political prominence as the highest court in 
the world’s largest empire, hearing cases at its center, which Smale, a 
judge at empire’s peripheries, did not.  This difference assisted in ensuring 
that Kwok-a-Sing became synonymous with British preeminence in China. 
The careful progression of the judgment crafted British authority 
and law in China as superior.  In first determining whether the vexing 
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Ordinance No. 2 applied to extradition warrants in Hong Kong despite the 
abrogation of the Treaty of the Bogue, the Lords Justices heard 
preliminary arguments from both the Attorney General and Kwok-a-
Sing’s counsel.  Despite representing “opposing” interests, all of the 
counselors were English by birth and education, and ultimately adhered to 
and promulgated a legal imperialist agenda.  For instance, in a response to 
a question posed by Lord Justice Mellish that, “I have an impression that a 
Crown colony has not jurisdiction to make such a law,” the Attorney 
General of Hong Kong argued that “[Hong Kong] is a Crown colony, and 
the Queen can give any powers.”122  This exchange demonstrated how the 
Privy Council and Attorney General single-handedly subordinated Hong 
Kong and its laws to those of Great Britain and the English common law, 
whose writ ran throughout the empire.  Colonies had no power in and of 
themselves; they depended solely upon London, whose authority was 
paramount, for such power. 
Even Kwok-a-Sing’s counsel ceased suggesting that Ordinance 
No. 2 failed to apply, as Chief Justice Smale would have it, following the 
abrogation of the Treaty of the Bogue.  Instead, he agreed that a legislative 
act passed in the wake of the initial Kwok-a-Sing judgment rendered “the 
new Ordinance . . . declaratory—that it declares that the Ordinance of 
1850 always did refer to the Treaty of Tientsin.”123  Thus, a legislative 
ordinance passed by the Hong Kong Legislature, whose powers derived 
from the Crown in London, declared that imperial law, particularly 
imperial treaty law, reigned supreme. The concessions and exchanges of 
both the legal counselors and the Privy Council merely underscored this 
point. 
This pattern of subordination, coupled with spectacular jingoistic 
syntactical salvos, continued throughout the foundational discussion of 
Ordinance No. 2, and proceeded into the resolution of the two issues.124  
In arguing that Ordinance No. 2 should not apply to all extradition cases, 
such as Kwok-a-Sing’s, the coolie’s counsel suggested that Britain take 
pity on his client “where the more humane laws of more civilized nations 
differ from those of China.  It would be an extraordinary arrangement, if 
we gave up persons [to China] not guilty of offences under the English 
Law.”125  The attorney’s message was clear:  English law was civilized; 
Chinese law was not.  By extraditing Kwok-a-Sing to China, the British 
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would effectively cast the coolie to an uncivilized nation of barbarians 
incapable of delivering justice.  The counsel’s appeal subordinated China 
and its “uncivilized” law to that of England, while simultaneously 
constructing the Chinese as a legally and culturally primitive society 
incapable of executing impartial justice. 
Indeed, the Privy Council agreed with this general argument in 
resolving the first issue of whether Chinese law provided for the 
punishment of a Chinese subject who had murdered a foreigner in foreign 
territory.  The Privy Council decried as too general Ordinance No. 2’s 
clause requiring that an individual be extradited if he had committed 
“crimes and offences against the law of China.”126  In discussing its 
reasoning, the Privy Council remarked that, read literally and broadly, the 
clause suggested that “every Chinese who had done something which the 
law of China treats as a political offence, or who had done anything which 
the law of China treats as criminal, though the law of all European 
countries treats it as innocent, might be given up.”127  The Privy Council 
implied that Chinese law, in addition to its primitive nature, may also have 
been too harsh and perhaps even barbaric.  Western law clearly departed 
from its Chinese counterpart in what it defined as criminal, and likely 
maintained more civilized, lenient standards befitting an enlightened 
population.  The failure the British to protect the average Chinese from 
ostensibly harsher punishment in China would prove a shortcoming of not 
only British justice, but also duty and responsibility.128  In consideration of 
these concerns, and in a further illustration of the supremacy of the 
Western legal order, the Council determined that “the words ‘crimes and 
offences’ ought to be confined to those ordinary crimes and offenses 
which are punishable by the laws of all nations, and which are not peculiar 
to the laws of China.”129  This bold implication that “the laws of all 
nations” meant the laws of civilized, Western nations effectively excluded 
China and condemned it as not comporting with the traditional legal order.  
The effect was to add to China’s ever-increasing humiliation. 
The assertion did more than subordinate and exclude China in a 
widely-published legal opinion; it also enabled the Privy Council “to 
consider whether there was evidence that Kwok-a-Sing had been guilty of 
crimes against the laws of China within the meaning of the Ordinance” 
that the Council had just clarified in condescending detail.130  In reaching 
the conclusion that in comparable laws did not exist in China to punish 
Chinese subjects for the murder of foreigners in foreign territories, the 
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Privy Council noted that “up to a comparatively late period, England had 
no such laws.”131  The sentiment only added salt to the wound.  The Lords 
Justice of the Realm had in fact implied that if England, the great civilizer 
and benefactor of the law, did not recognize crimes committed by its 
subjects upon foreigners abroad until the mid-nineteenth century, a 
“peculiar” and “ignorant” nation such as China most certainly would not 
have had such laws.132  Accordingly, Chief Justice Smale had correctly 
refused to extradite Kwok-a-Sing for murdering the French crew on La 
Nouvelle Pénélope.133  Of course, in the collective eyes of the Privy 
Council, Smale’s liberty-littered reasoning proved wholly incorrect, but 
the outcome, as affirmed and clarified by the Privy Council, stood as a 
testament to the power of the English common law and, along with it, the 
British Empire. 
The Privy Council employed much of the same jingoistic, 
patronizing reasoning in determining the second issue on appeal—whether 
Smale incorrectly released Kwok-a-Sing following the arrest warrant for 
piracy.  In support of their determination that prima facie evidence 
suggested “that Kwok-a-Sing had committed an act of piracy jure gentium 
to justify his committal for trial for that offence at Hong Kong,” the 
Council related the “international” definition of piracy articulated by Sir 
Charles Hedges, Judge of the High Court of Admiralty in the monumental 
Rex v. Dawson decision.  “Piracy is only a sea term for robbery, piracy 
being a robbery within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty,” Sir Charles had 
opined.134  Thus, “if the mariners of any ship shall violently dispossess the 
master, and afterwards carry away the ship itself or any of the goods with 
a felonious intention in any place where the Lord Admiral hath 
jurisdiction, this is robbery and piracy.”135  Notably, the “international” 
definition quite clearly had Western origins, as evidenced in the 
discussion of the Lord Admiralty’s jurisdiction. In the opinion of their 
Lordships, “there was unquestionably evidence that Kwok-a-Sing was a 
party to violently dispossessing the master and carrying away the ship 
itself and the goods therein.”136  Accordingly, “the only question can be 
whether there was sufficient evidence that the act was done with a 
felonious, that is piratical, intention,” and the answer to that question 
rested entirely within the purview of a jury in Hong Kong.137 
The Privy Council’s articulation of why Kwok-a-Sing should not 
have been released but rather remained in Hong Kong for trial without the 
possibility of extradition to China on the grounds of piracy, an 
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international crime, illustrated how the Lords Justices constructed the 
Chinese as legally, culturally, and politically inferior to Britain and the 
West.  Ordinance No. 2 and both the Treaty of the Bogue and the Treaty 
of Tientsin, three obvious canons of legal imperialism in China, clearly 
provided for the extradition of a Chinese subject who committed a crime 
or offence against the laws of China.138  Piracy ex jure gentium was 
regarded as an international crime.139  Further, both the governing Treaty 
of Tientsin and the abrogated Treaty of the Bogue both contained specific 
provisions requiring that Chinese authorities notify British officials of any 
piratical acts and “use every endeavour to capture and punish the said 
robbers or pirates, and to recover the stolen property.”140  All of these 
provisions indicated that Chinese authorities not only recognized piracy as 
a crime, but also that the British had explicitly authorized the Chinese to 
punish their subjects for acts of piracy.  Moreover, extradition ordinances 
and treaty provisions required the extradition of Chinese subjects who had 
committed acts of piracy, which as an international crime logically 
seemed “an offence against the laws of China.”141 
Yet extraditing Kwok-a-Sing for piracy proved most undesirable 
for the Privy Council, as it represented an encroachment on British 
political, naval, economic, and legal authority in the region.  More 
importantly, as Smale had noted in his first judgment, “[n]o mandarin 
would ask for the rendition of a Chinaman for killing a foreign kidnapper 
beyond the limits of China in order to punish him.  National sympathy 
would rather reward him.”142  To avoid these pitfalls, the Privy Council 
accordingly distinguished “the acts of piracy jure gentium with which 
Kwok-a-Sing was charged . . . from those acts of piracy which they have 
before stated to be, in their opinion, within the Ordinance and the 
Treaties.”143   Without offering any reasoning or evidence, the Privy 
Council “distinguished” Kwok-a-Sing’s particular brand of piracy as “an 
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offence against the municipal law of France, to which he was subject at 
the time, and not against the municipal law of China.”144  This accordingly 
barred China from seeking his extradition through the relevant treaty 
provisions and the ordinance.  Further, the Privy Council’s opinion created 
an insurmountable divide between East and West; effectively, Britain’s 
highest court had placed French law and jurisdiction above that of China, 
yet determined that a British court in Hong Kong would preside over the 
Kwok-a-Sing trial.  The Western powers, regardless of their own relations 
(nineteenth-century relations between France and Great Britain were 
notoriously poor), stood in uniform opposition to China, its politics, laws, 
and culture. 
In a final blow to China’s legal authority, the Privy Council 
remarked that: 
 
if [Kwok-a-Sing] is punishable by the law of China, he is 
only so punishable because he has committed an act of 
piracy which, jure gentium, is justiciable everywhere . . . 
[yet] such an offence is not an offence against the law of 
China within the meaning of the Ordinance.145 
 
This final line of reasoning in the piracy issue harkened to the 
earlier, nationalist-fueled discussion that “offences against the law of 
China” proved too broad and could have ostensibly resulted in the 
extradition of too many innocent Chinese who had committed acts that the 
barbarous Chinese authorities recognized as crimes and would accordingly 
punish, but which the civilized West would not. The Privy Council’s trick 
in its resolution of the piracy issue, however, was a subversion of the 
reasoning. Although the motives of individual justices remain unclear, the 
reasoning and language in the Privy Council’s judgment barring Kwok-a-
Sing’s extradition indicated the influences of paternalism and the 
augmentation of British political and legal power. In the subterfuge that 
has marked world politics for centuries past and will for centuries future, 
the Privy Council achieved its goals. 
VII. THE BITTER LEGACY OF DISCORD 
Although the Privy Council ordered that Kwok-a-Sing stand trial 
for piracy in Hong Kong, whether or not this trial occurred remains a 
mystery.  Indeed, the various academic references to the case and its slow 
progression through the labyrinthine court system of the British Empire 
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concern themselves with pedantic discussions of the colonial extradition 
law.146  Yet as the analysis of the various judgments and contemporary 
correspondences indicates, the actual language and text of the cases 
highlights the real fears experienced by contemporaries of Kwok-a-Sing in 
Hong Kong, mainland China, and London.  These were people with 
concerns—at least some, legitimate—for their nations’ preeminence in a 
global push towards industrialism, the protection of voiceless coolies, and 
even their own life and freedom.  For the Chinese, such concerns 
manifested themselves in the realization that the West used international 
law to consolidate power in the hands of the militarily mighty, while 
undermining culturally inferior states.147 
Kwok-a-Sing thus offers much more than just precedent on 
extradition law and piracy ex jure gentium.  Rather, it provides a window 
into a past world whose events have helped to shape the modern narrative 
of China’s relationship with the West.  It is only through reading and 
understanding what contemporary opinion in nineteenth-century Sino-
Western relations was like that we can begin to understand China’s 
continued reticence to fully engage with the international order.  Although 
Dutch East India Company officials apprised the Qing court of the “law of 
nations” in the late seventeenth century and such knowledge informed the 
signing of the Treaty of Nerchinsk with the Russians in 1689, the Chinese 
attitude towards international law during the early modern era remained, 
in the words of Ann Kent, “at worst, dismissive and, at best, 
instrumental.”148  The Chinese ambivalence towards Western political 
powers, and with it international law, grew during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, as Qing officials referred to the British as 夷 (yi, or 
“barbarian”) in various diplomatic and legal documents.149  The British in 
turn demanded in Article LI of the Treaty of Tientsin that “the character “I” 
夷 (“barbarian”) shall not be applied to the Government or subjects of Her 
Britannic Majesty, in any Chinese official document issued by the Chinese 
authorities, either in the capital or in the provinces.” 150   Ironically, 
Britain’s use of a treaty to compel the Chinese to halt their pièce 
de résistance further underscored how the West used its law to 
disenfranchise undesirable Chinese practices.  China’s traditional 
skepticism towards the international legal order of European imperialists 
finds further reinforcement in Kent’s contention that China only began to 
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use international law as a defensive mechanism against “the marauding 
West.”151  Measures such as the unequal treaties and stipulations requiring 
changes in Chinese practices coalesced with China’s defensive utilization 
of international law to yield a deeply ambivalent Chinese attitude towards 
the international order during the nineteenth century. 
Compounding this general humiliation and skepticism towards 
Western powers that dominated nineteenth-century Chinese thought were 
suggestions by the most exclusive, Western court in the world that “the 
coolies had, by fraud or by threats on the part of other Chinese, been 
induced to go to the barracoon, and embark on board the ship against their 
will.”152  Indeed, the West justified its role in China by suggesting that the 
Chinese had contributed to the enslavement of their own people.  The 
West—Britain, America, France—had to step in and control the situation 
politically, economically, and socially.  The law, Western law, provided 
the best means to regulate this barbarous society.  Paternalism accordingly 
served as a further justification for the imposition of inherently unequal 
laws, a damning component of nineteenth-century Sino-Western relations 
that continues to gnaw at the modern Chinese psyche.153  As Kwok-a-
Sing’s attorney argued before the Privy Council in an appeal to affirm 
Smale’s prior opinions and set Kwok-a-Sing free, “the coolies had 
reasonable ground for supposing that they were deprived of their liberty 
by the captain and crew of the ship; they took possession of the ship, and 
used a certain amount of violence with a view to recovering their 
liberty.”154  This noble pursuit that pitted the coolies against their French 
captors required that the arbiter of justice, the enlightened English high 
court, “in estimating the amount of violence that would be reasonably 
necessary under those circumstances, . . . apply a different standard in the 
case of ignorant Chinese coolies [from] that which would be applied in the 
case of Europeans.”155  Such distinctions and differences between the 
Chinese and the West as articulated by Europeans fueled Chinese 
contempt for the West. 
The legacy of this scorn continues to pervade the Chinese 
conscience and tinge the relationship between East and West more than 
140 years later.156  China’s ambivalence towards international law found 
support in the Communist Party assertion in 1957 that “International law 
is one of the instruments of settling international problems. . . .  However, 
if this instrument is not advantageous to our country . . . we will not use it 
                                                 
151 Kent, supra note 147, at 56. 
152 Kwok-a-Sing, supra note 1, at 201. 
153 COHEN, ESSAYS ON CHINA’S LEGAL TRADITION , supra note 10, at 284–85. 
154 Kwok-a-Sing, supra note 1, at 193. 
155 Id. 
156 COHEN, ESSAYS ON CHINA’S LEGAL TRADITION , supra note 10, at 284–85. 
192 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA EAST ASIA LAW REVIEW    [Vol. 7 
 
and should create a new instrument to replace it.”157  Such a deeply 
pragmatic, albeit skeptical, attitude towards engagement with the West has 
found multiple instances of support since the 1950s.  Indeed, China’s 
frequent refusal to support United Nations-led interventions reflects, to 
many observers, Jerome Cohen and Allen Carlson among them, China’s 
concerns regarding state sovereignty.158  Cohen has even gone so far as to 
suggest that, in light of the West’s manipulation of the law to disinherit 
China of its traditional glory, “[i]s it any wonder that Chinese leaders 
maintain a ‘vivid sense of outrage’ and manifest an almost obsessive 
concern with vindicating and preserving national sovereignty?”159 
Issues of sovereignty aside, Chinese film director Chen Shizheng 
suggested at the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing that “we Chinese 
carry the burden of our history with us and the question of Western 
humiliation is always unconsciously inside us. Thus we feel sensitive to 
any kind of slight and often have a very sharp reaction to perceived unfair 
treatment or injustices.”160   The fact that China has demonstrated a 
progressive engagement with the West since the late 1980s, participating 
in environmental and economic summits and even joining the World 
Trade Organization in 2001, indicates a “profound transformation” in 
Chinese thought.161  Nonetheless, even scholars as optimistic as James Li 
Zhaojie allow that the old international regime and its antecedents in the 
nineteenth century affected China’s mentality as “victim-minded 
underdog.”162  As Chen allowed, “on an emotional level we cannot help 
but associate treatment in the present with past injuries, defeats, invasions, 
and occupations by foreigners.”163  It is this continued association of past 
injustices at the hands of the West’s legal and political order that continue 
to affect Sino-Western relations. As Peter Hays Gries wrote in China’s 
New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy, “[t]he West is central 
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to the construction of China’s identity today; it has become China’s alter 
ego.”164 
The construction of that identity began with the first Western 
incursions into China by Dutch traders during the seventeenth century and 
was thoroughly honed by the British in their ruthless pursuit of economic 
and political self-interest during the nineteenth century.165  In this context, 
the Kwok-a-Sing decisions serve as but one minute portion of a complex, 
multi-national tableau of clashing empires and ideologies.  Yet in Kwok-a-
Sing the vast array of laws, treaties, political concerns, human rights issues, 
and the omnipresent jockeying for global power that characterize the 
international political order, both then and now, all appeared.  Kwok-a-
Sing provides, therefore, a valuable paradigm from which to assess 
modern issues of Chinese reticence towards the Western political and 
legal orders.  A thorough assessment of the legal and political framework 
implemented by British authorities in Kwok-a-Sing proves instrumental to 
understanding why China remains skeptical and derisive towards Western 
influence in Chinese affairs.  The language of the treaties, ordinances, and 
opinion in Kwok-a-Sing further underscore a paternalistic tone that has not 
wholly left the Western-Sino debate regarding the proper treatment of 
individuals.  As China looks towards a new, leading role in the 
international order in this century, it would behoove Western politicians, 
policymakers, businesspeople, lawyers, and academics to examine the 
West’s past experience with China.  For it is this past that China knows all 
too well, and the West all too little. 
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